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Abstract
The vast majority of today’s mobile malware targets
Android devices. This has pushed the research effort
in Android malware analysis in the last years. An im-
portant task of malware analysis is the classification
of malware samples into known families. Static mal-
ware analysis is known to fall short against techniques
that change static characteristics of the malware (e.g.
code obfuscation), while dynamic analysis has proven
effective against such techniques. To the best of our
knowledge, the most notable work on Android malware
family classification purely based on dynamic analysis
is DroidScribe. With respect to DroidScribe, our ap-
proach is easier to reproduce. Our methodology only
employs publicly available tools, does not require any
modification to the emulated environment or Android
OS, and can collect data from physical devices. The
latter is a key factor, since modern mobile malware can
detect the emulated environment and hide their mali-
cious behavior. Our approach relies on resource con-
sumption metrics available from the proc file system.
Features are extracted through detrended fluctuation
analysis and correlation. Finally, a SVM is employed
to classify malware into families. We provide an ex-
perimental evaluation on malware samples from the
Drebin dataset, where we obtain a classification accu-
racy of 82%, proving that our methodology achieves
an accuracy comparable to that of DroidScribe. Fur-
thermore, we make the software we developed publicly
available, to ease the reproducibility of our results.
1. Introduction
The relentless growth of smartphone sales and their
pervasiveness in our daily lives fostered the develop-
ment of malicious software for attacking mobile de-
vices. Android OS is the most diffused platform for
mobile devices [7], its source code is publicly avail-
able. Moreover, the majority of Android devices still
run dated versions1. These factors combined together
make Android smartphones attractive for several mal-
ware authors [25]. For these reasons, the majority of
mobile malware is designed to attack Android. Ac-
cording to F-Secure, 79% of mobile malware in 2013
were designed to attack this OS [6]. Only in 2015,
Symantec observed a 230% increase of malicious An-
droid apps with respect to the previous year and no-
ticed the raise of mobile malware leveraging evasion
techniques to avoid the detection of signature-based
security products [23]. These techniques include mo-
bile app obfuscation and virtualized environment de-
tection. In particular, the adoption of obfuscation tech-
niques has facilitated the spread of variants of already
known malware, with 40% growth in 2015. Obfusca-
tion techniques modify app’s packages and/or source
code, preserving app original functionalities, and al-
low malware authors to create semantically similar ap-
1https://developer.android.com/about/dashboards/index.html
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plications that are syntactically different from each
other (e.g. the same trojan application can be dis-
tributed under the guise of two completely different
harmful software). Combining together trivial and ad-
vanced obfuscation techniques reduces the effective-
ness of anti-malware products from 95% to 40% [19].
In response to the progress of malicious software,
the field of malware analysis has advanced as well
along different directions [13]. In addition to malware
detection, which entails classifying software samples
as either benign or malicious, other relevant research
paths have emerged. One of the most interesting is
malware family classification, which consists in classi-
fying malware into families. Samples belonging to the
same family show similar behavior, exploit the same
vulnerabilities and have the same objectives, hence
family classification can be used to quickly check if
an app is a variant of already known malware 2. While
Symantec registered a significant growth of Android
mobile malware variants, they have not identified the
same trend in the number of newly discovered mal-
ware families: just a 6% increase in 2015 over the
previous year, and only 1% in 2016 [24]. Such ten-
dency suggests an evident slowdown in the innovation
of mobile malware development, which can be lever-
aged by analysts with the use of family classification
techniques. Indeed, automatic malware family classi-
fication allows malware analysts to timely understand
whether a malicious app is likely to be a variant of
known malware (i.e., it belongs to an already known
family) or if instead is a novel malware (i.e., it does
not belong to any known family). This enables ana-
lysts to focus on really brand new malicious apps only,
without wasting time and effort on dissecting samples
similar to others already analysed in the past. Given
the huge amount of new mobile malware produced ev-
ery day, using family classification to filter out what
apps deserve more detailed analyses becomes funda-
mental. In practice, malware analysts can perform two
different types of analyses: static and dynamic. Static
2It is to note that classifying malware in families is different
from categorizing them according to their type (e.g., a dropper, or
a trojan): as an example, there can be droppers of distinct fami-
lies which perform the same general task (i.e., installing the actual
malware somewhere in the target system) but in diverse ways (e.g.,
one can download the malware from the web and the other can
contain itself the malicious payload and decipher it when needed),
hence their behaviors would correctly result dissimilar.
approaches do not require the execution of samples un-
der analysis and can potentially reveal all the sample’s
execution paths. Nevertheless, they are not very ef-
fective against obfuscation techniques, as extensively
demonstrated in [19], and are not able to track both
modifications at runtime and generated network traf-
fic traces [25]. Dynamic techniques overcome these
limitations by executing samples in controlled envi-
ronments.
This paper focuses on malware family classifica-
tion. We present a methodology that relies on dy-
namic analysis and propose a software architecture im-
plementing it. The architecture automatically executes
Android applications in a sandboxed environment and
generates stimuli to simulate user inputs. During each
run, it collects resource consumption metrics from the
proc file system, and processes them through de-
trended fluctuation analysis (DFA) [18] and Pearson’s
correlation [16]. At the time of writing, the most im-
portant work on Android malware family classifica-
tion, based on dynamic analysis, is DroidScribe [5].
We compare our methodology to that of DroidScribe
by carrying out an extensive experimental evaluation
on the same dataset as DroidScribe. Results show that
our methodology achieves comparable accuracy, but
(i) it is easier to reproduce and (ii) collected data can
be gathered on physical devices. Indeed, our approach
only employs publicly available tools and does not re-
quire any modification to the emulated environment or
Android OS. Conversely, DroidScribe relies on Cop-
perDroid, which is not publicly available and it is only
accessible through an on-line service. Nevertheless,
it is not suitable for batch experiments, since it take
in input a just one sample and submission procedure
cannot be automated as it requires to pass an anti-bot
challenge-response test. At the time of writing, the
service does not analyze enqueued APKs since July
2015. In addition, differently from CopperDroid, our
methodology can collect data on physical devices as
well. This is a key factor, since modern mobile mal-
ware can detect the emulated environment and hide
their malicious behavior. To the best of our knowledge
our methodology is the first based only on resource
consumption metrics and DFA [25].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 discusses the related work. Section 3 presents
proposed methodology and architecture. Experimen-
tal evaluation and comparison with DroidScribe are
reported in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes the
paper and outlines future work.
2. Related Work
Android malware family classification is a well
known problem in literature and differs from malware
detection regarding the final objective of the analysis,
which considerably affects what specific techniques
are employed although in general similar approaches
are used. For example, while binary classifiers are
generally used for malware detection (i.e., a sample is
either benign or malicious), multiclass classifiers are
instead commonly employed for family classification
(i.e., one class for each family), but the set of extracted
features can be very similar. Most of the works rely-
ing on Android dynamic analyses monitor APIs and
system calls. To the best of our knowledge, our work
is the first to address family classification leveraging
resource consumption metrics.
Karbab et al. [11] use dynamic analysis and Natu-
ral Language Processing (NLP) to detect and classify
Android malware. Mobile applications are executed
into a sandbox to generate a report of their activities,
later processed by NLP techniques. By means of these
techniques, the authors are able to produce a signature
for identifying and classifying malicious apps. Reina
et al. [20] implemented CopperDroid, a framework to
execute Android apps and collect information about
system calls. DroidScribe [5] uses CopperDroid as
building block to execute Android apps and trace per-
formed system calls. DroidScribe is the most notable
work on Android malware family classification, purely
based on dynamic analysis and machine learning, that
shares most similarities with our objectives.
Similarly to our work, Shehu et al. [21] use re-
source consumption metrics to create a fingerprint for
each mobile application under analysis. However, they
address a different problem, that is detecting obfus-
cated malware variants. Moreover, their methodology
is tested manually on a physical device over a rather
small set of 7 malicious applications. In this paper, in-
stead, we automate the whole process of malware fam-
ily classification and test our results on a larger dataset.
Other works leverage resource consumption metrics
or power consumption to detect Android malware. Liu
et al. [14] and Kim et al. [12] look at power consump-
tions of mobile devices to detect malware. Anyhow,
these works are based on obsolete mobile platforms
and this type of analysis can be performed on device
only as power consumption metrics are not meaningful
when measured on emulators or simulators. Amos et
al. [1] implemented an automatic framework for ex-
ecuting and collecting resource consumption related
features to feed different machine learning algorithms.
Nevertheless, they evaluated their accuracy over a test
set of only 47 applications. Canfora et al. [3] lever-
age resource consumption metrics to detect Android
malware. However, these works do not address family
classification.
Finally, Mutti et al. [15] developed BareDroid, an
efficient system for analysing Android Malware on de-
vice. On device analysis has the great advantage to be
immune to emulator evasion techniques but is more
time-consuming, since physical devices require more
time to be reset to a clean state with respect to an em-
ulator. The authors showed experimentally that Bare-
Droid allows to reduce this time by a 4.44 factor.
3. Methodology
As already discussed, this paper focuses on mal-
ware family classification. That is, the task is to take in
input malware samples and classify each sample into
its family. We assume that the set of Android malware
families F is fixed and known a priori.
Our methodology can be summarized as follows. In
a prior training stage, we collect a large set of known
malware M in which each sample has already been
labeled with the family it belongs to. M must con-
tain members of each family in F . In our experiments
we employed the Drebin dataset [2]. For each sample
s ∈ M we run s into a controlled emulated environ-
ment and collect some runtime metrics over time, so
as to obtain a time series for each metric. In partic-
ular, our methodology only relies on monitoring re-
source consumption metrics that can be obtained from
the proc file system. Then, we process these metrics
so as to extract the fingerprint as detailed later. Fi-
nally, we train our classifier with the set of generated
fingerprints (labeled with the corresponding family).
Whenever, a new malware sample s is given in input,
we run s into our controlled emulated environment and
we build its fingerprint. Then, we feed our classifier
with the newly generated fingerprint, which, in turn,
outputs the family of s.
3.1. Fingerprint Generation
The first phase of fingerprint generation for a mal-
ware sample s is the execution of s in our controlled
emulated environment. During the execution we stim-
ulate the malware with a predefined set of input events.
The input events are automatically simulated by our
emulator (refer to Section 3.3 for implementation de-
tails). To make the simulation of input events con-
sistent across different executions, we always gener-
ate the same random sequence of events. During the
execution we monitor and collect n metrics from the
proc file system over time, at a sampling interval
τ . In our experiments we monitored n = 26 metrics
at a sampling frequency of 4 Hz (τ = 0.25s). We
monitor a set of system-wide and application-specific
metrics, including CPU, memory and network usage.
Thus, at the end of the execution we obtain a time
series xi(t) for each metric xi. After each execution
the emulator is reset to its original image, so that each
new execution starts in the same runtime environment.
Then, we process the collected time series so as to ex-
tract a vector of features f = g(x1(t), . . . , xn(t)) =
(f1, . . . , fm) that characterizes the malware family
(where g is the feature extraction algorithm). The fea-
ture vector f represents the fingerprint computed for
the malware sample s. An appropriate set of features
to include in the fingerprint is determined during the
training phase, as detailed in Section 3.2.
3.2. Classification and Training
To classify the malware family we feed a support
vector machine (SVM) classifier with the fingerprint
computed as described in the previous section. The
SVM has to be previously trained on a set of sam-
ple fingerprints, labeled with the corresponding correct
malware family.
The training phase serves two main purposes:
(T1) determine the set of features to be included in
the fingerprint and (T2) train the classifier. The first
task defines the feature space of the classifier. Deter-
mining an appropriate set of features is fundamental to
correctly classify.
Both tasks need a training dataset. The first step of
the training phase is the collection of such a dataset.
We execute each malware sample s ∈ M in our
emulated environment and we collect the monitor-
ing metrics as described in Section 3.1. For each
malware sample, we perform q runs. The larger q,
the lower the probability that noisy data and out-
liers affect the classifier training (in our experiments
q = 2). At the end of this step, we get the time series
xis = (x1(t), . . . , xn(t)) for each run i = 1, . . . , q of
each sample s ∈M.
For the purpose of task (T1) we first process each
vector xis = (x1(t), . . . , xn(t)) through DFA. We
have opted for DFA, in place of similar methods, be-
cause it has no parameters to tune, thus allowing for
an automatic approach. In particular, for each time se-
ries xi(t), i ∈ [1, n], we compute the DFA exponent
αi. To support our intuition that the DFA exponent
may be a valuable feature for malware classification,
we conducted some experiments to show the stabil-
ity of such a parameter when applied to resource con-
sumption metrics of an Android application (see sec-
tion 4.3). In addition to DFA exponents, we compute
the correlation matrix of x1(t), . . . , xn(t), so that we
obtain a Pearson’s correlation coefficient rij for each
pair of distinct metrics xi, xj . Thus, we end up with
an initial set of n(n+1)2 = 351 features, consisting in
n = 26 DFA exponents and n(n−1)2 = 325 correlation
coefficients.
This initial set may contain features that are redun-
dant, may not be useful to discern the malware fami-
lies, or even mislead the classifier. Thus, we perform
feature selection to determine an appropriate subset of
features to feed the classifier. To this aim, we take a
wrapper approach [9], that is we exploit the classifier
itself to evaluate the goodness of a particular subset of
features. Given a candidate subset of features we train
the classifier with that set, and we use the training ac-
curacy (i.e., the accuracy obtained on the validation set
during training) as a measure of its goodness. Finally,
we retain the subset that allowed to achieve the best
accuracy.
The candidate subsets of features are constructed as
follows. For each feature f in the initial set of all
features we compute the mutual information [4] be-
tween the distribution of all samples of f and the cor-
responding distribution of labels (i.e., malware fami-
Figure 1. Proposed architecture and workflow
for Android malware family classification.
lies). The mutual information function gives us a co-
efficient that quantifies how much knowing the value
of the feature f for a generic malware sample s,
gives us information about the family of s. Intu-
itively, the larger the value of the mutual information
for a given feature, the most valuable it is to recog-
nize malware families. We consider subsets of fea-
tures such that each feature has a mutual informa-
tion value that is at most Q% less than the maximum
value obtained. We generate such a dataset for each
Q ∈ {10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50}. Moreover, we
process each subset of features through principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA) [10] to further reduce the fea-
ture space.
We train a SVM for each subset and finally retain
the subset of features that yield the best training accu-
racy. These features are the ones that form the feature
vector, i.e., the fingerprint, which completes task (T1).
This also results in the completion of task (T2). In-
deed, the corresponding trained SVM becomes the
classifier.
3.3. Implementation
In this section we describe an implementation of our
methodology that we used in our experiments.
3.3.1. Architecture
Figure 1 shows an architecture for our methodology
and its expected workflow. Central to the architecture
are the emulator, that executes an instance of Android
in which malware samples are run, and the related
Controller, that handles any interaction with the em-
ulator. First, when a new malware sample is submitted
to the system (in form of an APK) the controller is in
charge of installing the application into the emulated
Android and launch it. During the execution, the app is
stimulated through a sequence of random input events
by means of the Input Events Simulator (IES) compo-
nent installed in Android. During the input stimulation
phase, the Metrics Collector component accesses the
proc file system of the emulated instance of Android
through the Controller. Every sampling interval τ , the
Metrics Collector requests access to the proc file sys-
tem through the Controller, read resource consumption
metrics, and stores them in a local file.
When the IES component notifies the Controller
that all input events have been simulated, the latter
stops the execution of the application and reset the em-
ulator to its initial conditions. Finally, the Fingerprint
Generator analyzes the file containing collected met-
rics to extract the features and generate the fingerprint
of the submitted application. The fingerprint is, then,
given in input to the SVM classifier which outputs the
family of the malware sample.
3.3.2. Third Party Tools
To implement the proposed architecture we em-
ployed several publicly available third-party tools. We
briefly present each one, before discussing how to in-
tegrate them to build the architecture.
VirtualBox3 is an open source hypervisor. It allows to
virtualize a guest operating system on a physical ma-
chine potentially running a different OS.
Genymotion4 is an Android emulator that leverages
VirtualBox for virtual environment creation. Genymo-
tion provides all the features of a real mobile device,
which can be controlled and monitored using Virtual-
Box’s command-line interface.
Android Debug Bridge5 (ADB) is a command-line
tool enabling an OS to interact with an emulated An-
droid device and have access to all its resources. ADB
also handles installation as well as launch and termi-
nation of applications.
3https://www.virtualbox.org/
4https://www.genymotion.com/
5https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb.html
UI/Application Exerciser Monkey6 is a program run-
ning on Android devices which can be invoked by the
command-line through ADB. It generates stimuli for
apps running on the Android emulator by simulating a
wide variety of inputs including touches, movements,
clicks, system events, and activity launches.
NOnLinear measures for Dynamical Systems7
(NOLDS) is a Python package that includes different
algorithms for one dimensional time-series analysis,
including DFA, sample-entropy and Hurst exponent.
NumPy8 is a Python package for scientific computing.
We employ it to compute the correlation matrix.
Scikit-learn [17] is a Python package that includes
several machine learning algorithms for supervised
and unsupervised learning, including SVMs.
3.3.3. Tools Integration
The core of our architecture, namely the emula-
tor, is realized through Genymotion. ADB serves
as the Controller component. It handles the installa-
tion of applications in the emulator, and can start and
stop applications through the appropriate commands.
The UI/Application Exerciser Monkey runs within An-
droid and can simulate input events on any running
application. Interactions with Monkey are handled
by ADB. It is possible to ask Monkey to generate a
random sequence of events. The sequence is univo-
cally identified by a seed and thus is reproducible. In
our methodology we make Monkey always generate
the same random sequence of input events. It im-
plements the IES component. The Metrics Collector
component of our architecture is implemented through
Python script which periodically interacts with ADB.
When all input events have been simulated by Mon-
key, the application is stopped as well as the virtual
machine. Also, the original image of the Android vir-
tual machine is restored through the VirtualBox com-
mand line tool. The Fingerprint Generator is imple-
mented as another Python script that processes the file
containing the collected metrics and computes the fin-
gerprint. The features are computed through appro-
priate functions of the NOLDS and NumPy packages.
Finally, the classifier is built and trained through the
6https://developer.android.com/studio/test/monkey.html
7https://github.com/CSchoel/nolds
8http://www.numpy.org/
Figure 2. Box plot of the DFA exponents
among 30 independent executions for a ran-
domly sampled malicious app, for each of the
26 metrics.
Scikit-learn package. The whole workflow described
above is completely automated and handled through
proper Python scripts. All materials required to re-
produce the experiments has been made available on
a Github repository9.
4. Experimental Evaluation
We carried out an extensive experimental evaluation
to validate our approach. In this section we discuss the
details of the experiments and present the results.
4.1. Dataset
We performed our experiments on the Drebin
dataset [2]. It is a public collection of malware samples
that can be used for research purposes, that contains
5,560 malicious applications from 179 different fami-
lies. The Drebin dataset has been widely employed in
the related literature [8, 3, 5, 11, 22]. Since we com-
pare our solution to DroidScribe, in our experiments
we selected the same families as DroidScribe.
9https://github.com/lucamassarelli/AMFC-BRCT
4.2. Experimental Setup
We run our experiments on a physical machine with
an 8 cores Intel Xeon CPU and 16 GB of RAM.
All software, including the emulator (Genymotion and
VirtualBox) and the Python scripts that control the
workflow of the experiments run on this machine.
The emulator runs an unmodified instance of Android
4.0. We chose this version of Android because it was
released during the period in which the samples of
Drebin dataset were collected.
We implemented our methodology as described in
Section 3.3. In every execution we generate the same
random sequence of simulated input events through
Monkey. Furthermore, we configured Monkey to gen-
erate each event type with equal probability. In all
experiments we generate S = 10, 000 input events.
This number has been determined after a preliminary
study on the stability of the DFA exponent with re-
spect to increasing numbers of generated input events.
The results of this analysis are discussed in the next
section. The stability of the Pearson’s correlation co-
efficient between resource consumption metrics of An-
droid apps has been already studied in [21]. Every
experiment is conducted in isolation as we reset the
emulator after every execution.
4.3. Stability of the DFA exponent
In order to be useful, the fingerprint of an applica-
tion should remain consistent across different execu-
tions. Despite the conditions of the experiments are
kept constant across different executions, a bit of vari-
ability is inevitable, due to multiple factors that are out
of our control, such as network latencies and work-
load fluctuations. Therefore, we do not expect the fin-
gerprint to remain perfectly constant across different
executions. However, it is sufficient for our purposes,
that the variability is bounded.
As starting point we fixed the conditions of the ex-
periments and we assessed the variance of the DFA
exponent across several executions. We selected a ran-
dom sample of malicious apps, executed each malware
30 times, collected the 26 metrics and computed the
corresponding DFA exponents. Figure 2 shows the re-
sults of these experiments for a single application. For
each of the 26 collected metrics the figure shows the
box plot of the corresponding DFA exponent. The bot-
tom and top of each black box represent, respectively,
the first and third quartiles of the DFA exponents com-
puted for a given metric. The white line within each
black box is the median value of the DFA exponent
of the related metric. Whiskers show the interquartile
range and points are outliers. As the figure shows, the
DFA exponents are not constant across different exe-
cutions, but they are characterized by a low variance.
This preliminary result supports our intuition that the
DFA exponent may be an appropriate feature for the
fingerprint.
Subsequently, we assessed the stability of the DFA
exponent with respect to the number of simulated in-
put events. We performed several experiments on a
random sample of malicious apps with an increasing
number of stimuli S, ranging from 2, 000 to 14, 000
with step equal to 1, 000. For each app and value of
S we performed 5 runs, and in each run we computed
the DFA exponents for all metrics. Figure 3 shows
the trend of the DFA exponent for 3 selected metrics
(user CPU usage, resident set size, number of transmit-
ted packets) with increasing numbers of stimuli. Each
point is relative to a metric x and a fixed number of
stimuli S. It reports the mean value of the DFA ex-
ponents computed for the metric x during the 5 runs
in which the number of generated stimuli was S. The
bars represent standard deviations. As the plot shows,
the mean value of the DFA exponent appears to be
stable enough across different numbers of generated
stimuli. Also, the variance appears small enough for S
from 4, 000 on. From such results, we decided to fix
the S = 10, 000, as it seems a good trade-off between
experiments duration and DFA exponent stability.
4.4. SVM Training and Test
In our experiments we employed a C-SVM with a
radial basis function (RBF) kernel as the classifier. To
build the training set we split our dataset of malware
samples: 70% for training, and remaining 30% for the
test. For each training sample, we performed two in-
dependent executions, and thus we computed two fin-
gerprints. These fingerprints, labeled with the corre-
sponding malware families, constitute the training set.
We repeated the same procedure with the test sam-
ples to build the test set. We trained the SVM with
Figure 3. Stability of the DFA exponent for
three different metrics: User CPU, Resident
Set Size, Transmitted Packets.
5-fold cross-validation and evaluated our approach on
the test set. We repeated this procedure for 20 dif-
ferent 70%-30% random training/test partitions of the
dataset. We evaluated the accuracy of the classifier
and finally compute the mean accuracy across these
20 repetitions. During the training phase we follow
the methodology reported in Section 3.2 to determine
the best subset of features to employ.
4.5. Results
We evaluate our methodology by assessing the ac-
curacy of our classifier. A commonly employed tool
which gives a quick graphical overview of the perfor-
mance of a classifier is the confusion matrix M . The
generic element Mij of the matrix is the number of
samples belonging to class i that has been classified as
j by the classifier. Figure 4 shows the confusion matrix
of our classifier. Each element has been normalized in
0-1, by dividing it by the sum of the related row, and
the corresponding value as been codified with a gray
scale for ease of visualization.
To quantify numerically the performance of the
classifier we employ three common metrics: accu-
racy, recall and precision. The accuracy is an over-
all measure of the performance of the classifier, that
can be defined from the confusion matrix M as
Accuracy =
∑
iMii∑
i
∑
j Mij
. Precision and recall, instead,
are class-related measures, and are defined as fol-
Figure 4. Normalized confusion matrix of the
SVM classifier.
lows: Precisioni = Mii∑
j Mji
, Recalli =
Mii∑
j Mij
After
20 repetitions of our training and test methodology de-
tailed in the previous section we obtained a mean value
of 82% for the accuracy with a standard deviation of
1%. In Figure 5 we report mean and standard deviation
values (depicted, respectively, as bars and whiskers) of
precision and recall for each malware family. From
this figure and the confusion matrix depicted in Fig-
ure 4, it is evident that some families achieves a nearly
perfect classification (i.e. Fakedoc, MobileTx, Kmin,
Opfake). Conversely, two families, Boxer and Gein-
imi, are misclassified most of times. In particular, the
first is often confused with the FakeInstaller family.
By analyzing some samples of this family we discov-
ered that they contain the same activities as samples
from the FakeInstaller family. Moreover, by submit-
ting these samples to VirusTotal10, we noticed that
some antiviruses classify them as Boxer.FakeInstaller.
This probably means that the behavior of samples of
the Boxer family is very similar to that of samples in
the FakeInstaller family. Thus, our classifier is of-
ten misled. Instead, most of the samples belonging
to the Geinimi family crash at launch time or during
the execution and we were able to collect data only for
7 applications of this family. This strong imbalance
in the proportion of these samples in the training set
could probably be the reason of the bad performance
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Figure 5. Precision and recall values for all
the 23 classes.
achieved for this class.
4.6. Comparison with DroidScribe
We classify malware into families with a SVM as
in DroidScribe. Using a SVM classifier they are able
to achieve 84% accuracy on the Drebin dataset. As
already stated, we evaluate the accuracy for 20 differ-
ent random splittings of the dataset into a training set
and a test set, and then compute the mean value. The
authors of DroidScribe do not provide enough details
about how the dataset was split. Even though this pre-
vent a precise comparison, our results (82% accuracy)
are similar achieved by DroidScribe.
DroidScribe also presents some results using con-
formal prediction to improve the accuracy of their ap-
proach. In some cases, the confidence on the class
output by classifiers (such as SVMs) can be very low.
This may reduce the accuracy due to the fact that the
classifier has to choose a single class even though the
confidence is only slightly larger than the one on other
classes. Conformal prediction tries to mitigate this
problem by letting the classifier output a prediction set,
instead of a single class. That is, a set of classes for
which there is enough confidence that the set contains
the true class. In DroidScribe, they claim to be able
to improve the accuracy from 84% to 94% by using
conformal prediction. They achieve 96% accuracy on
malware families for which the confidence is below a
certain threshold. However, in this case, the average
10https://www.virustotal.com
prediction set size is 9. By including all malware fam-
ilies, the accuracy decreases to 94% with a set size of
p > 1 (p is not specified in their paper). The value of
the accuracy has to be necessarily related to the aver-
age prediction set size 〈accuracy, set-size〉 to be signif-
icant. There is no evidence, in general, that 〈94%, p〉
is better than 〈84%, 1〉. Thus, the two results are not
directly comparable. For these reasons, we compare to
the solution of DroidScribe employing the SVM clas-
sifier without using conformal prediction.
5. Conclusion
In this work we have presented a novel methodol-
ogy to classify Android malware into their belonging
families. The proposed approach is based on dynamic
analysis and leverages resource consumption metrics
collected during app execution. Our approach is able
to classify malware with an accuracy of 82%. This
result is similiar to that obtained by DroidScribe, a
state-of-the-art work which is the most related to ours.
Nevertheless, our methodology has the following ad-
vantages: (i) it is easier to reproduce because only
employs publicly available tools and does not require
any modification to the emulated environment or An-
droid OS, and (ii) collected data can be gathered on
physical devices. In particular, the last point is cru-
cial since many modern malware rely on evasion tech-
niques to hide their malicious behavior on emulated
environments.
As future work, we plan to increase the number of
collected metrics that can effectively help in classify-
ing malware families and test other machine learning
algorithms to reach better accuracy results. Moreover,
we plan to evaluate our methodology on a more re-
cent and larger dataset of malware samples, which has
been recently released [26]. Another aspect we intend
to investigate is on-line learning. This would allow
to reduce the time required for updating the classifier
and, thus, timely classify new malware families. Fi-
nally, it would be interesting to test the effectiveness
of our methodology on physical devices to be more ro-
bust against evasion techniques based on the detection
of emulated environments. At this regard, we can in-
vestigate the possibility to integrate BareDroid [15] in
the proposed architecture to reduce analysis overhead
time.
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